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The instability of Pacific politics is often traced to the weakness of 
its political organisations. In Papua New Guinea, the Organic Law 
on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates was put in place 
to stabilise politics by enhancing the role of parties in parliament, 
but its impact has been debatable. We look at the causes of weak 
parties in Papua New Guinea and compare the political system in 
Papua New Guinea with that of industrialised democracies where 
political parties are stronger. This comparison suggests ways that 
political parties in Papua New Guinea might be strengthened—in 
particular, through a reformed ‘slush fund’ for parties.
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What is the cost of political 
instability?
Achieving political stability in the interest of 
achieving prosperity has been a long-term 
goal in the Pacific. Sir Rabbie Namaliu, a 
former prime minister of Papua New Guinea 
and long-time politician, noted that political 
stability was one of the prime goals for Pacific 
nations (Address to Asia-Pacific Round 
Table Meeting, Sydney, 15 March 2004). The 
lack of such stability, Sir Rabbie argued, 
had undermined the public’s confidence in 
democracy and their belief in governments 
as a whole. Mahendra Pal Chaudhry, during 
his term as Prime Minister of Fiji, expressed 
similar concerns; he claimed that political 
instability, engineered by a small group of 
‘power-hungry politicians’ with the aim 
of wrestling control of government from 
him, would have a disastrous impact on 
the economy (Fiji Daily Post, 12 October 
1999). Dr Derek Sikua, the Prime Minister of 
Solomon Islands, complained that political 
instability had plagued his nation during its 
30 years of independence and argued that 
restoring political stability was essential 
to building a stable society (‘Solomons 
Prime Minister to fight instability’, Solomon 
Times Online, 30 March 2009). Kalkot 
Mataskelekele, the President of Vanuatu, 
urged parliament to consider means of 
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reducing political instability (‘President 
of Vanuatu addresses political instability’, 
Vanuatu Daily Post Online, 13 June 2009).
Political instability has had a deleterious 
impact on the rate of growth of the afflicted 
economies. Manning (2005:147) noted from 
evidence gathered from surveys of the 
business sector in Papua New Guinea that 
political instability—in addition to problems 
of law and order, corruption and high costs 
of infrastructure services—was reported as 
a major impediment to private investment. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) found a similar 
pattern in sub-Saharan African nations.
A fragmented community—possibly 
one with ethnic, religious and regional 
cleavages—is most prone to political 
instability. Prasad (2003) argues that ethnic 
divisions have undermined the formation 
of a cohesive state in Fiji. This, in turn, 
Prasad contends, has fractionalised Fijian 
society, leading to the breakdown in law 
and order, and is responsible for erosion of 
the quality of governance—the cumulative 
effects of which have been greater inequality 
in income distribution and rising levels of 
poverty. According to Prasad, the reversal 
of this trend requires the building of 
social cohesion. This claim harks back to 
a larger international literature (Easterly 
and Levine 1997) that suggests that social 
cohesion—defined as ‘a state of affairs 
in which a group of people (delineated 
by a geographical region, like a country) 
demonstrate an aptitude for collaboration 
that produces change’ (Ritzen, Easterly 
and Woolcock 2000:6)—is necessary for 
development. According to this literature, 
socially cohesive societies are more likely 
to deliver inclusive governments than those 
that are not cohesive.
While creating cohesive societies could 
be a long-term process, one of the proximate 
causes of political instability has been the 
fluidity of political parties. Such fluidity 
has been particularly pervasive in the 
four Melanesian nations of the Pacific (see 
Gelu 2005 for an excellent survey of this 
problem in Papua New Guinea). Inducing 
longer-lived political parties therefore has 
the potential to lower political instability. 
This is the challenge taken up in this article. 
We draw on economic theory to suggest 
interventions to address observed political 
instability within Papua New Guinea. Some 
of what is found could be applied to other 
countries across the Pacific.
Why is Pacific politics so 
unstable?
Some of the recent commentary on Pacific 
politics, such as Kurer (2007), places the 
blame for political instability on clientelism. 
Clientelism is described as ‘particularist rent 
seeking’ in which politicians are interested 
primarily in diverting public money to the 
narrow interest group they represent. Is this, 
however, really the distinguishing feature of 
Pacific politics that sets it apart from other 
democratic political systems?
Pacific politicians are not exceptions in 
being particularist rent seekers. The former 
US Speaker of the House, ‘Tip’ O’Neill, 
famously remarked: ‘All politics is local.’ 
By this, he is presumed to have meant 
that politicians must always consider the 
impact of policies on the voters who elected 
them—their own political district. An often-
used phrase in US presidential elections is 
‘Are you better off today than you were four 
years ago?’ Voters in the United States are 
assumed to vote for their own particular 
interest.
Annual budgets in industrialised 
democracies are enormous documents. They 
are not, however, enormous because of the 
lengthy discussions of programs; they are 
enormous because of the number of specially 
targeted spending programs that are 
included in them. The job of most politicians 
Strengthening political partieS in the pacific
37
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 1 © 2010 the australian national University
during budget times is to try to get as many 
programs for spending started in their own 
constituencies as possible. The US advocacy 
group Citizens Against Government Waste 
listed 10,160 line-item projects in the 11 
appropriations bills that formed the US 
Federal Budget in 2009 (http://www.cagw.
org/site/PageServer?pagename=reports_
porkbarrelreport). These 10,160 projects 
are typically targeted spending programs 
within an individual politician’s district.
Senator Robert Byrd of the US state of 
West Virginia is famous for his ability to 
obtain large federal projects for his relatively 
poor state. According to Grunwald (2006), 
these projects include the Robert C. Byrd 
Freeway, the Robert C. Byrd Expressway 
and the Robert C. Byrd Highway—part of 
the Robert C. Byrd Appalachian Highway 
System. It is difficult to imagine how the 
United States as a whole benefited from 
the creation of a large Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) complex with 2,500 
employees in the remote state of West 
Virginia, 250 miles from Washington, DC. As 
the most senior member of the US Senate, 
Byrd now sits on the powerful Senate 
Appropriations Committee and has been 
rewarded with a promised expansion of the 
FBI facility in Clarksburg, West Virginia—
doubling its size (http://byrd.senate.gov//
mediacenter/view_article.cfm?ID=577).
Is what Byrd has accomplished not a 
case of clientelism—benefiting a narrow 
group at the expense of the rest of the 
country? And would a West Virginian voter 
not regard what Byrd has accomplished as 
something that should be rewarded? On 
the basis of his political longevity (Byrd has 
been in the US Senate since 1959), Byrd’s 
rent seeking has obviously found favour 
with his voters. Voters in the Pacific, just 
like voters in West Virginia, do not mind 
rent-seeking politicians, as long as the rent 
seeking favours them.
Former Australian prime minister 
John Howard, in his failed 2007 re-election 
campaign, flew to a small district in the 
small state of Tasmania to announce a A$50 
million rescue package for a local hospital. 
A prime minister flying into a small district 
to deliver a very narrow spending program 
is just as much an example of particularist 
rent seeking as you would find in any Pacific 
context. Prime Minister Howard assumed 
that voters in that district would reward him 
with their votes in the next election out of a 
particularist interest.
It is on this issue of voter self-interest that 
Kurer seems confused. Kurer (2007:43) asks 
‘why do voters behave…in a manner that 
seems contrary to their long-term material 
interests’ when they keep re-electing 
politicians who engage in particularist rent 
seeking? The answer is that voting for your 
own politician, who brings projects into 
your district—such as Byrd does for West 
Virginia—is in your self-interest. What 
voters would like to do is to stop other 
voters from voting in their own particularist 
rent-seeking politicians. Voting for rent-
seeking politicians is in an individual 
voter’s interest, whether in an industrialised 
or a developing country; but it is not rational 
for the group of all voters in a country.
Even the models used by political scientists 
in industrialised democracies support the 
view that those politicians are rent seekers. 
The political concept of ‘log-rolling’ in the 
United States (or ‘horse trading’ in the English 
system) is to design a combination of programs 
that benefits narrow groups in several political 
districts so that politicians in those different 
districts will all vote for a combined program. 
This concept is commonly used to explain 
the actions of politicians in industrialised 
democracies. The underlying assumption is 
that politicians vote for programs solely on the 
basis of whether those programs will benefit 
voters in their district. How is this different 
from clientelism in the Pacific?
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So, if particularist rent seeking does 
not set politicians and the political system 
in the Pacific apart, what does set Pacific 
politics apart? Politicians in all democracies 
are particularist rent seekers, but not all 
politicians behave as badly and as brazenly 
as some Pacific politicians. The reason 
for this is that institutions exist in other 
democracies that to some extent control the 
degree of narrow rent seeking by politicians. 
In industrialised democracies, this control 
of politicians is undertaken primarily by 
political parties. What sets Pacific politics 
apart, then, are not the incentives of 
individual voters or of individual politicians, 
but the lack of any substantial party control 
over the behaviour of politicians. In blaming 
clientelism, commentators are focusing on 
the symptoms of the problem but missing 
the real problem, which lies in the weakness 
of political parties in the Pacific.
Why are political parties so weak 
in the Pacific and why do weak 
parties lead to instability?
Political parties are weak in the Pacific, 
but parties are the basis of politics in 
industrialised democracies. In a typical 
textbook on political parties in the US 
and European contexts, Ware (1996:1) 
introduces his book with the sentence: ‘In 
contemporary states it is difficult to imagine 
there being politics without parties.’ In an 
Australian context, Jaensch (1994:1) writes: 
‘parties and the party system are…the 
critical components in the polity.’
How different is the status of parties in 
the Pacific? Gelu (2005) describes a PNG 
political system in which politicians prefer 
to run as independents and join parties 
after the election, based on which party is 
likely to be in government and where they 
are likely to reap the maximum benefit. 
Rather than a foundational role, parties 
play only a minor role in Pacific politics (see 
also the description in Morgan, Baker and 
Hambly 2005). Politicians frequently swap 
parties. Parties can have members both in 
the government and in opposition. Parties 
have very little control over the voting 
pattern or behaviour of their members. 
Pacific politicians act much like the ‘citizen 
candidates’ of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) 
and Besley and Coate (1997)—politicians 
without parties.
Fraenkel  (2008)  is  correct  that 
democracies existed before parties. Why 
would voters in a province vote for a 
politician who would vote in the interests of 
a party when those interests could conflict 
with the local interests of the voters in the 
district? The weak political parties of the 
Pacific are a function of a more natural state 
of politics than the strong political parties of 
the industrialised countries. It is probably 
due to the fact that political parties pre-
dated the rise of modern political economy 
that Ware and Jaensch can talk as they do, 
as though political parties are necessary 
components of democracy. If, however, 
political parties are not a necessary part of 
modern democracy, are they desirable?
If the difference between Pacific politics 
and politics in industrialised countries 
lies in the weakness of political parties 
in the Pacific, we should ask why parties 
are so strong in some countries and so 
weak in others; and we should identify the 
structures in industrialised democracies 
that enhance parties and those structures 
in the Pacific that impair parties. To do this 
we need to set out the role that parties play 
in modern politics. In particular, we wish to 
know why politicians find joining a party 
advantageous and why voters might prefer 
a politician who is a member of a party.
One possible reason for the existence 
of parties is the difficulty and expense of 
communication with voters. If politicians 
group together in a party, they can gain 
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economies of scale in communication with 
voters. Osborne and Tourky (2008) set out 
a similar basis for party formation. Parties 
provide money and organisation to allow 
individual politicians to reach a wider 
audience than they would without a party. 
The question then is: what does a politician 
and a party communicate to a voter? The 
politician communicates the characteristics 
of the party to the voter: the party is a 
‘brand’. By communicating that he/she is a 
member of a party, the politician is signalling 
to the voter that the politician shares in the 
‘brand’ that is the party. Snyder and Ting 
(2002) set out a model of party formation as 
‘branding’.
Why, however, might it benefit a voter to 
vote for a politician running as a member of a 
party rather than that politician running as an 
independent? After all, if party identification 
signals that there is some party discipline 
within the party, a politician in a party 
is transmitting to voters the statement: 
‘Sometimes I will vote in your best interest, 
but sometimes my party will make me 
vote for something that is not in your best 
interest.’ Why might a voter prefer to vote 
for a politician who is suggesting that 
sometimes he/she will not act in the voter’s 
best interest?
An answer is that a party brand could 
ensure better behaviour from politicians. 
Part of the value of that brand is a statement 
about how the politicians in that party will 
act. A party that is a worthless brand will 
not be able to attract politicians; so parties 
with strong brand value have an incentive 
to protect their brand by monitoring the 
behaviour of party members. The party 
brand, moreover, provides longevity to 
policies. Thus, a voter from a constituency 
who loses at any point would weigh this 
cost against future restraints placed on other 
constituents who would otherwise have 
gained at his/her expense. In other words, 
a party brand name increases the patience 
level of individual voters. The absence of 
such a brand name does the opposite.
By staking out a brand, parties can reduce 
the particularist rent-seeking behaviour of 
their own members, as in Grossman and 
Helpman (2005). Parties can force individual 
politicians to take account of wider interests 
in their voting. When political parties force 
bloc voting, the individual politicians might 
vote against the best interests of their own 
supporters based on wider national interests 
based on party calculations. Voters might 
think this is a good trade-off, if it means that 
politicians in other districts will vote against 
the interests of their own supporters and for 
wider concerns.
The challenge of reducing political 
instability in the Pacific is therefore to 
induce the formation of political parties that 
will confer net benefits on party members 
and their followers. The fact that such 
parties pervade industrialised democracies 
warrants scrutiny.
Why are parties so strong in industrialised 
democracies and so weak in the Pacific? 
Partly this is because party strength is self-
enforcing. Strong parties with established 
brands—such as the major political parties 
in industrialised democracies—have an 
incentive to police the activities of their 
members to protect their brand. Parties that 
have valuable brands will be parties that 
politicians want to join and will fear being 
expelled from; so party discipline is strong.
Pacific parties, however, have little 
value, so they have minimal incentive to 
protect brand value. Pacific parties that 
fail to monitor and police their members’ 
behaviour diminish their brands of the value 
they might have had. This creates a negative 
feedback loop. Knowing that the brand is 
weak, politicians and voters defect whenever 
the costs of doing so exceed that of abiding 
by the conditions set. A weak party therefore 
constitutes a trap from which a community 
might be unable to escape.
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This fact of self-enforcing brand strength 
does not help us very much with options for 
moving to strong parties. It does, however, 
suggest that once parties are strengthened, 
they will stay strong. Furthermore, a nudge 
out of the trap of weak parties could create 
positive feedback, leading to strong parties 
and increased political stability. Could such 
a ‘nudge’ be given through specific policy 
interventions?
Another reason why politicians might 
join parties is to access party resources. 
In industrialised democracies, politicians 
in parties gain access to money and party 
organisation. Parties are often tied to 
particular interests, such as labour unions 
or large or small businesses, and can raise 
cash and labour through those interests. In 
most industrialised democracies, parties 
are supported with money from the 
government.1 In Australia, for example, 
the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) 
pays money to the political parties after each 
election, based on the number of primary 
votes the party received in the election, but 
only for the parties that receive more than 
4 per cent of total first-preference votes. 
This payment was initially structured as a 
reimbursement for party campaign costs 
but was changed to be a direct payment 
for each vote (Ghazarian 2006). After the 
2007 Australian federal election, the AEC 
allocated A$22 million to the Australian 
Labor Party and A$16.7 million to the Liberal 
Party of Australia. Payments to all parties 
after the 2004 Australian federal election 
totalled A$41.9 million (http://www.aec.
gov.au/pdf/publications/behind-the-
scenes-federal-election-2007.pdf).
In industrialised democracies, individual 
politicians rarely have access to large social 
networks from which to draw labour to 
assist in elections, apart from labour unions 
or special interest groups. Parties therefore 
function as sources of paid and volunteer 
labour for politicians. The government 
provides some paid labour through the 
offices of elected members. In the Australian 
federal system, each Member of Parliament 
is entitled to three office staff paid for by the 
government. Ghazarian (2006) describes 
a common situation in which staffers 
are traded across politicians through the 
party—from ‘safe’ electoral offices to 
‘marginal’ electoral offices.
In the Pacific, politicians have access 
to far larger funds outside of parties, so 
have less need to join parties for access to 
party funds. In Papua New Guinea, elected 
members have access to provincial ‘slush 
funds’, which makes elected members even 
less dependent on parties for support. These 
slush funds are attached to the individual 
politician as opposed to the party of which 
he or she is a member. Politicians in the 
Pacific also have access to a potentially 
large supply of labour through clan systems 
and other social networks. Again, these 
networks are attached to the individual 
politician rather than the party.
Since individual politicians in the Pacific 
have access to money and labour outside 
of parties, individual politicians are much 
more powerful relative to parties in the 
Pacific and Papua New Guinea than they 
are in industrialised democracies. With 
weak parties, the effect of weak brands is 
that party discipline will be minimal. What, 
then, are the consequences of having weak 
parties and little party discipline?
Parties serve many functions within 
democracies but one of the most important 
functions that parties serve in industrialised 
democracies is to police the politicians. 
We could imagine various agents that 
could punish political misbehaviour by 
politicians, such as voters, parliament, the 
justice system and political parties.
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Voters typically get to punish politicians 
only at an election, which can be several 
years in the future. In Papua New Guinea’s 
current political system, where the majority 
of politicians are voted out at each election, 
the threat of not being re-elected is not 
very effective for most politicians who are 
looking at serving only one term in any 
case. Even through the ballot box, voters 
are also unreliable enforcers of certain 
kinds of good behaviour. If a politician is 
accused of diverting public funds to their 
own electorate, why would a voter in the 
province be angry at the politician for that? 
Certainly Senator Byrd’s voters in West 
Virginia do not think that way.
Some parliaments are effective in 
policing bad behaviour, but this form of 
sanction has not worked well in the Pacific 
as yet. The justice system has also proved 
very ineffective in controlling politicians in 
the Pacific and in Papua New Guinea. 
In political systems such as Australia 
and the United States, the parties often 
police the behaviour of politicians, and 
it is the strength of the party brands that 
forces parties to act against their own 
politicians. The parties react first to news 
of the misbehaviour of politicians. Often 
well before the matter is brought to the 
attention of police and courts or parliament, 
misbehaviour by politicians can lead to their 
expulsion from parties. As expulsion from a 
party generally means the end of a political 
career in an industrialised democracy, 
expulsion is a grave punishment.
Given the weakness of political parties 
in the Pacific, we are left with the infrequent 
and slow-moving responses of voters, 
parliaments and the courts to sanction 
misbehaviour. There is therefore little 
effective punishment for misbehaviour 
by politicians, even when those acts make 
the front pages of the daily newspapers. 
The poor behaviour of Pacific politicians 
is due partly to the lack of any institutions 
capable of enforcing good behaviour by 
politicians.
Why did the organic law fail 
and what can we learn about 
strengthening parties in the 
Pacific?
Critics of government support for 
parties—such as the AEC payments in 
Australia or government provision of labour 
for incumbent members—have described 
these payments as unfairly advantaging 
larger parties at the expense of smaller 
parties and independent members (for 
example, Sawer 2004). We, however, think 
this unfairness is necessary: parties should 
be given unfair advantages in order to 
empower them relative to their politicians.
The Organic Law on the Integrity of 
PNG Political Parties and Candidates 
Integrity Bill (2001) (OLIPPAC), legislated 
by the Morauta government, was an attempt 
to strengthen the role of political parties 
in the PNG Parliament. According to John 
Nonggorr, its principal architect, and as 
reported in Gelu (2005), the OLIPPAC 
required that 
the Prime Minister be appointed in 1. 
a manner with a direct relationship 
to the expressed wish of voters
members of parties who left those 2. 
parties had to give substantial 
reasons for leaving
political parties vote as a bloc 3. 
on selecting a prime minister 
during no-confidence measures, 
on constitutional amendments and 
on the budget.
Reilly (2002) contended that the 
OLIPPAC was aimed at stabilising executive 
government, principally by limiting motions 
of no-confidence in the government. The 
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absence of such votes of no-confidence 
since the passage of the OLIPPAC is said 
to be evidence of its success. Gelu (2005), 
however, disputes this claim, arguing that 
the incumbents’ success is a reflection of 
their abilities to stave off such motions by 
using tactics such as deferring the sitting 
of parliament. The OLIPPAC, nonetheless, 
constitutes a ‘stick’ in that it strips a member 
of his/her seat for defecting from his/her 
party’s stance on a vote of no-confidence. 
Rewards for sticking together on party lines 
are, however, absent.
The failure to change incentives for 
individual politicians is the primary reason 
for the limited success of the OLIPPAC. 
While the OLIPPAC did regulate some 
actions by Members of Parliament, it 
failed to change the incentives that led to 
misbehaviour. Individual politicians still 
felt that they could gain from causing 
instability, so they continued their previous 
behaviour. As Gelu (2005) argued, only 
extreme measures by Prime Minister 
Somare avoided the usual instability that 
afflicted parliamentary politics in Papua 
New Guinea; and large resource rents at the 
disposal of the incumbent administration 
provided a means of holding factions 
together.
The weakness of political parties in 
the Pacific is due to the inability of parties 
to offer any advantage to individual 
politicians. Parties are resource poor and 
have no brand value to offer. The OLIPPAC 
has changed none of this; it has only made 
party membership more constraining. A 
sensible response by politicians to this 
change would be to go independent or 
create a party of one member. This is what 
we have seen. The 2007 elections in Papua 
New Guinea saw 29 parties take part in the 
elections, and 20 of the 109 seats were won 
by independents (Adam Carr’s Election 
Archive, http://psephos.adam-carr.net, 
accessed 30 January 2010). This ‘party-
strengthening’ legislation is in fact doing the 
opposite: inducing fragmentation of parties 
by pushing politicians into parties of one.
Fraenkel (2008) expressed concern 
that party-strengthening legislation such 
as the OLIPPAC would only entrench the 
advantage of élites in Pacific democracies. 
We believe that party-strengthening 
legislation has achieved this and has done 
so by weakening Pacific political parties.
In order to change the behaviour of 
politicians, the incentives that politicians 
face need to be changed. Politicians have 
to face real costs for causing instability. As 
we saw earlier, politicians face no real costs 
for misbehaviour because the institutions 
that punish in other democracies—the 
parties—are weak. Parties are weak in the 
Pacific because individual politicians have 
access to money and labour outside of the 
parties.
How, then, to strengthen parties in Papua 
New Guinea and the Pacific? Changing 
access to money is one method. In other 
democracies, it is the parties that receive 
financial support from the government 
rather than individual politicians. The 
‘slush funds’ in Papua New Guinea are 
politically destructive not only because they 
cause corruption but—more importantly—
because the slush funds keep politicians 
independent of parties.
We advocate that the slush-fund money 
be paid to political parties rather than to 
individual Members of Parliament.2 The 
funds paid to political parties should be 
based on the number of party members the 
party has in the parliament at the start of 
an electoral cycle, which is roughly what 
is done in Australia. The funds should be 
paid directly to the party rather than to 
its representatives and should be paid on 
a quarterly or biannual basis. If a member 
leaves a party, the party should lose that 
funding; but importantly, the funding 
should not transfer to the new party that 
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the member joins. Members would then 
face a real cost in switching parties: their 
party support money would not travel 
with them.
This change in the allocation of the 
slush funds has several advantages. It 
will cost nothing in terms of government 
revenue, as it is simply a reallocation. Once 
given to parties rather than to individual 
politicians, the funds strengthen the power 
of parties relative to members. The funds 
can also be used as a mechanism to change 
the structure of parties. For example, in 
Australia, a party has to receive more 
than 4 per cent of first preferences in the 
national election to be eligible for the party 
support, so limiting the minimum size of 
parties and strengthening parties relative to 
independents. A minimum size for a party 
to be eligible for party funding—say, by 
requiring that eligible parties have at least 
six members in parliament—would prevent 
members from simply going independent, 
although independent members might 
receive some level of support at a lower 
rate. A large enough disparity between the 
support for independent members and the 
support for political parties will induce 
party formation by Papua New Guinea’s 
parliamentarians.
An issue with all reforms is to structure 
the reforms so that affected interest groups 
will be in favour of the reform. A potential 
obstacle to changing the use of PNG slush 
funds in this way is that the very people who 
are currently receiving the slush funds will 
be the ones who will vote on the changes. 
One possibility is to reallocate the slush 
funds to the parties but to double their 
size, so that politicians have some incentive 
to vote for the changes. The increase in 
spending will have revenue implications, 
but an improvement in political stability 
could more than pay for this.
Conclusions
Drawing on the economic theory of political 
parties, this article has considered means 
of addressing political instability and 
misbehaviour by politicians in Papua New 
Guinea and more broadly in the Pacific. It 
has been argued that political instability 
and other types of political misbehaviour 
are principally the result of having political 
parties with weak brands. Therefore, 
reducing political instability boils down 
to inducing formation and sustenance of 
more representative and stronger political 
parties.
Politicians in industrialised democracies 
join parties in order to gain access to the 
money and labour of established parties. 
Individually, politicians rarely have access to 
large amounts of resources. Comparatively, 
in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere in the 
Pacific, incumbent politicians have large 
individual funds from government and 
access to labour through clan and other 
social relationships. Parties are weak in the 
Pacific because they have little to offer a 
politician. Where, as in Papua New Guinea, 
the current system allocates budgetary 
resources to individual politicians rather 
than to their parties, it helps keep political 
parties weak.
We propose that this relationship 
be reversed. Instead of the ‘slush funds’ 
going to members as representatives of 
their district—as is currently done—they 
should be paid to the party. It is crucial 
that the funding of parties is increased 
and the funding of politicians is reduced. 
Only then will politicians be reliant on 
their parties for financial support, rather 
than being independent. This system of 
party support would be similar to that 
used in industrialised democracies, such 
as Australia, which supports political 
parties rather than individual politicians. 
Furthermore, party support should be 
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available only to parties of a minimum size 
in parliament—as is done in Australia. This 
would encourage parties to be more broadly 
representative of the voting population.
These reforms would mean that political 
parties in Papua New Guinea would have 
the power to reward politicians with 
cash, the power to punish politicians who 
misbehave and the power to compel voting 
in some cases. With these measures, larger 
and stronger political parties should emerge 
that take into account issues and policies 
that are in the interest of the population of 
Papua New Guinea generally rather than 
of politicians’ particular constituencies. 
Attempts at political engineering, such as 
the OLIPPAC, have tried to achieve this but 
have not been successful because they have 
not changed the incentives politicians face. 
In an environment of already weak parties, 
making party membership more onerous 
through efforts such as the OLIPPAC are 
far more likely to further weaken, not 
strengthen, political parties. We propose 
that using the slush funds in this way will 
produce incentives that ‘bite’ and have a 
much greater chance of achieving positive 
outcomes. This would complement the 
existing mechanisms that penalise defection 
from a party by a member.
Notes
1  According to Ware (1996), two-thirds of the 
industrialised democracies had state funding 
of parties by the late 1980s.
2 Section 82 of the OLIPPAC legislation 
does allow for a government payment to 
registered parties of K10,000 for each Member 
of Parliament. This sum is insignificant, 
however, compared with the slush fund each 
incumbent politician has access to.
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